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Abstract
In this paper we explore the welfare implications of voluntary compliance within
an emissions trading program and derive optimal permits allocations to affected and opt-in
sources when the environmental regulator has incomplete information on individual
unrestricted emissions and control costs. The regulator faces a trade-off between
production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction
(reduction of excess permits allocated to opt-in sources). The first-best equilibrium can be
attained if the regulator can freely allocate permits to affected and opt-in sources;
otherwise a second-best equilibrium is implemented. The latter is sensitive to uncertainty
in control costs and benefits.
                                               
*
 Any correspondence should be sent to: Catholic University of Chile, Casilla 306, Correo 22, Santiago, Chile. E-mail
address: jpmonter@ing.puc.cl.
C'A(q)
0
$ / q
q
B'(q)
qTAqTA -EA
A
B
D
C
C'AOP(q)
E
F
G
HI
J
K
L
M
N
P
Q
q'TAq'TA -EA'
Figure 1.  Net benefits from voluntary compliance
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Figure 2.  Optimal allocations for affected and opt-in sources
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Figure 3.  Likelihood of a non-affected source opting-in
